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ABSTRACT
Academic literature indicates that implementing trading programs into regulatory 
policy can yield substantial cost savings. Additionally, existing trading programs report 
cost savings and improved efficiency. This project evaluates a nutrient trading program 
for the James River, and models its effects on the private cost of nutrient reduction.
Data for land cover, nonpoint source nitrogen loadings, point source sites and 
loads, best management practices and efficiencies, and cost per unit reduction were 
collected. The Chesapeake Bay Agreement forty percent reduction goal was used as a 
watershed nitrogen reduction goal. Data were input into Excel’s Solver linear 
programming model in order to model the least-cost outcome under each scenario. 
Scenarios included single point sources purchasing credits in various increments as well as 
trades including all entities in the watershed. Transport coefficients were added to the 
model to account for the behavior of nitrogen along the waterway.
While the model results were confined by data limitations, results indicated cost 
savings from 38% with a single point source purchaser to nearly 90% savings when the 
entire watershed can sell and purchase credits. The James River has potential as a 
watershed for trading application, but further research is necessary to determine the 
specific parameters necessary in order to ensure water quality and economic sustainability.
DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS OF A NUTRIENT TRADING PROGRAM FOR
THE JAMES RIVER WATERSHED
PREFACE
"In response to President Clinton’s Reinventing Environmental Regulation (March
1995), EPA is strongly promoting the use of watershed-based trading." This statement 
begins the EPA’s May 1996 "Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading" which lays 
out a national plan for pollution trading and provides thorough evaluation of options. The 
rationale behind pollution trading schemes is that they apply economic principles to 
environmental problems in order to reduce costs. Although the EPA draft was not 
published until 1996, nutrient trading programs have been employed on a local level since 
the mid-1980s. There is still, however, only scattered academic literature on the subject. 
This study aims to evaluate the potential for implementation of a nutrient trading scheme 
in the James River watershed (VA), one of the major tributaries to lower Chesapeake Bay.
INTRODUCTION
The Clean Water Act (CWA) is the federal legislation that deals most directly with 
pollutant discharge into the nation’s waterways. It presents numerous assessment 
methods, water quality standards, permit structures, and the penalties for noncompliance. 
Such “command and control” regulation provides clear direction and a rigid structure of 
standards and means of achieving specific water quality goals. While providing fairly 
predictable successes with respect to pollutant levels, command and control regulation 
often places heavy economic burdens on those companies forced to comply with the 
regulations. Compliance with pollution reduction programs can trigger outright 
unwillingness to comply, regional economic losses, or possibly bankruptcies.
Pollution trading presents an alternative market-based option wherein pollution 
reduction is viewed in the context of the entire watershed rather than discharger-by- 
discharger. The rationale behind pollution trading is best described by the following 
hypothetical example.
Two companies make up the entire pollutant discharging population on a 
waterway. Each discharges only nitrogen as a byproduct of its operation. The regional 
environmental agency finds excessive levels of nitrogen in the waterway. As a 
consequence, each producer is required to reduce its nitrogen input by 200 lbs/day. If 
Company One can achieve this reduction at $30/lb and Company Two can reduce at 
$ 10/lb, the corresponding costs, without trade, would be as follows:
Reduction Responsibility 
Amount Reduced In-House
Unit Reduction Cost
Company One
200 lb/day 
200 lb/day 
$30/lb
200 lb/day 
200 lb/day 
$ 10/lb
Company Two
TOTAL COST (without trade) $6000/day $2000/day
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If a trading scheme were implemented, Company One would examine its high reduction 
cost and be willing to buy pollution credit units from Company Two for about $20 per 
unit. Company Two would then take on the responsibility of reducing its nitrogen output 
by the full 4001b/day and Company One would maintain its current level of emissions. The 
costs then change as follows:
Company One Company Two
Reduction Responsibility 200 lb/day 200 lb/day
Unit Reduction Cost $30/lb $ 10/lb
Amount Reduced In-House 0 lb/day 400 lb/day
In-House Control Cost $0/day $4000/day
Payment for Credits $4000/day $-4000/day
TOTAL COST (with trade) $4000/day $0/day
Savings from Trading $2000/day $2000/day
Therefore, there is a $4000/day savings from the trading program while 
achieving the required 400lb/day reduction of nitrogen to the waterway.
This simplified example does not account for other pollutants or producers, 
transaction costs, trading ratios, uncertainty, or feasibility of larger scale reductions, but it 
does illustrate the general character of benefits in a market-based solution. The entire 
basis of trading programs lies in the fact that firms will experience varying costs associated 
with pollution reduction. As long as the overall level of pollution reduction is achieved 
and water quality is improved, allocating the reduction to those entities that can reduce 
pollution at the least cost yields a more efficient outcome. Low-cost reducers can be 
compensated by high-cost reducers who can then maintain their current pollution 
emissions.
There are several possible categories of trading in a watershed-based system 
because of the number of pollutants entering waterways and various types of discharging 
entities. Each category deals with either point or nonpoint sources. Point sources “are
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direct dischargers that introduce pollutants into waters of the United States” (EPA 5-96) 
and include public-owned and private wastewater treatment plants, industrial dischargers, 
mining operations, aquaculture, and municipal stormwater outfalls. These point sources 
are required to comply with the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) established in Section 402 of the Clean Water Act (“Draft Framework” 1996). 
The nonpoint source category describes sources “discharging” pollutants more indirectly 
through erosion, runoff, or snowmelt to the surface waters as well as seepage to 
groundwater with its possible recontamination of surface water. Typical nonpoint sources 
include agriculture, silviculture, urban development, construction, land disposal, and 
modification of flow or channel structure.
Although there is no explicit control of nonpoint sources described in the Clean 
Water Act, the 1987 Water Quality Act requires states to develop programs to assess and 
manage nonpoint source pollution with the help of the EPA (Malik 1993). Section 6217 
of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments (CZARA), commonly referred to 
as the “Coastal Nonpoint Program,” places a specific burden on coastal states and requires 
them to implement nonpoint source nutrient management for land uses adjacent to 
impaired or threatened coastal waters. In addition, Section 319(b)(4) of the 1987 
Amendments to the Clean Water Act allows states to design nonpoint source management 
plans on a watershed-by-watershed basis. Congress allocated $143.75 million for such 
projects between FY90 and FY92; however, much of the cost is left up to states in 
addressing nonpoint source pollution (Letson 1992). Some states have addressed the 
problem in part by employing provisions for “best management practices” (BMPs) to
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control pollutants from nonpoint sources (“Draft” 1996); these are be outlined below.
Hall and Howett (1996) state that “Both House and Senate versions of the Clean Water 
Act reauthorization bills for the last two years have contained provisions for a watershed 
approach to water quality improvement.” Additionally, Virginia’s 1995 Potomac Basin 
Tributary Strategy states that “[a] number of approaches . . . could be used . . .  to 
minimized the costs of nutrient reductions. A useful example . . .  is a system of nutrient 
trading” (Kerns and Stephenson 1996).
Considered in the watershed context, the options whereby point and nonpoint 
dischargers can interact to offset pollution loads are:
(1) Point/Point Source Trading: One point source, finding an excessive burden to 
reduce its discharges, contracts with another point source for greater-than- 
required emissions by the second in order to make up for the shortfall of the 
first.
(2) Intra-plant Trading: A single point source erects an imaginary “bubble” over all 
of its outfalls and ensures only that its total emissions comply rather than 
ensuring that each outfall complies independently.
(3) Point/Nonpoint Source Trading: A point source agrees with a nonpoint source 
for pollution reduction by the latter (usually lower cost) instead of costly 
upgrades of the effluent treatment by the former.
(4) Nonpoint/Nonpoint Source Trading: A nonpoint source arranges for 
reductions by another nonpoint source in lieu of upgrading or installing its own 
pollution prevention practice. Wetland mitigation projects are often 
considered under this category.
For the first three types of trading categories, for which at least one of the partners 
is required to have an NPDES permit, there exist two general trading frameworks. First, 
the total maximum daily load (TMDL) framework can guide trades. A TMDL describes 
the loading capacity of a particular watershed and identifies current sources and potential
5
areas of reduction or remediation. A requirement for a TMDL is that a link be established 
between ambient water quality conditions and pollutant reductions on the watershed and 
local level. A TMDL framework is not possible in many situations, however, because 
many receiving waterways do not have a TMDL computed. Second, existing point source 
permits can be used, and trades can be arranged through the established permit process. 
The permittee is held accountable for achieving the required pollutant reductions, but 
could allocate its reduction burden to another entity within the watershed by offering 
payment. Additionally, public or private “banks” could facilitate trades by dealing in a 
pollution credit currency (“Draft Framework” 1996).
In general, resource managers prefer to treat a watershed as a unit when evaluating 
policies because of the interactions that take place along a waterway that are larger than 
established political units. The EPA developed a watershed screening process that would 
identify the basic characteristics needed for potentially successful trading. These steps are 
as follows:
(1) Are trades consistent with water quality and other environmental objectives? 
Trading will be most attractive if sources already meeting requirements are 
looking for more cost-effective means to meet additional requirements, or 
numerous sources are being forced to comply with additional in-stream water 
quality requirements;
(2) Will either potential trading partner benefit from trading?
Success will be surer with a number of potential traders in both the point and 
nonpoint-source category, with varying treatment methods, and with different 
degrees of purity required; and
(3) Are administrative arrangements available to support trading?
Administrative coverage should be on the same scale as the trading area; 
participants’ information needs must be met; existing institutional structure 
should be utilized; trades must be facilitated and documented; and monitoring, 
accountability, and enforcement tools must be in place (“Draft Framework”
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1996).
Answers to these questions can serve to evaluate the three pillars of effluent control: water 
quality, economics, and administration.
EXAMPLES OF TRADING APPLICATIONS 
Trading Under the Clean Air Act
The EPA applied a market-based strategy to air pollution control with mixed success. The 
Clean Air Act instituted a program for sulfur dioxide discharge in 1975, using bubbles, 
netting, offsets, and banking to facilitate reduction load reallocation. Bubbles are the 
cornerstone of the Emissions Trading Program and most closely represent the theoretical 
concept of free market pollution trading. In this scheme, an imaginary “bubble” is placed 
over a plant or region so that emissions are evaluated for the whole rather than pipe-by- 
pipe. This allows existing sources to transact internal (or external) trading in order to 
comply with emissions limits. Netting is similar to a bubble except that it occurs only 
within a single plant. A firm creating a new source of pollution will obtain permits from 
other areas of the plant through internal trading. Offsets involve trading between firms in 
areas that have not attained the ambient air quality standards. Prospective new effluent 
sources can purchase offsets from existing firms and may commence business where 
otherwise they would have been prohibited. Finally, banking adds a time component to 
trading. Through banking, entities may save permits beyond their normal time limits in 
order to redeem them at some future time (“Draft Framework” 1996).
A table from Hahn (1989) indicates a “probably insignificant” or “insignificant”
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environmental quality impact for each trading activity, and savings are estimated to be 
from “small” for banking to over $300 million for netting and bubbles over the life of the 
program. The researchers determined that companies tend to utilize internal transactions 
much more frequently than external agreements. This is partially because of the high 
transaction cost of inter-facility trading. As a result of its tremendous cost savings 
coupled with insignificant, if any, degradation in air quality, EPA Administrator Lee 
Thomas has described the air pollution trading program as “one of the EPA’s most 
impressive accomplishments” (Hahn 1989).
However, Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991) find that the bubble policy has failed to 
be as successful in practice as it was predicted to be in theory. They find that while 
bubbles have resulted in cost savings, they have failed to achieve the most cost-effective 
allocation of pollution. The “trading process hypothesis” suggests that while trades are 
modeled as being open and with few constraints, the corporate trading atmosphere is 
characterized instead by sequential and bilateral trades. By creating an algorithm that 
models the actual dynamics of the trading process, the authors find that the bilateral trades 
which conform to EPA regulations yield less dramatic cost savings than those modeled by 
a mathematical programming equilibrium. Additionally, a restriction that trades cannot 
decrease air quality at any receptor site (the “constant-emissions rule”) means that traders 
cannot take advantage of areas where pollution is already lower than legally required in 
order to gain cost savings. The Emissions Trading Program in the Clean Air Act 
demonstrates that when restrictions are imposed in an environment in which only limited 
information is available to traders, there is a tendency for for more internal, rather than
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external, trading and failure to fully realize the benefits of free market trading.
Lead Trading
The lead trading program contains the most free-market approach to trading in the natural 
resources context. Trading lead in gasoline was permitted beginning in 1982 and 
terminated in 1987 in response to a mandated reduction in gasoline lead levels. There was 
a very high volume of trades, with over half of the refineries participating. Hahn (1989) 
attributes the success of the lead trading program to two key features. First, the amount 
of lead in gasoline is readily measured and easily monitored. Second, the program was 
grounded in specific and already-established environmental goals.
Existing Watershed-Based Programs
The concept of applying trading programs dates from the mid-1980’s. There are 
26 programs currently in place or specifically proposed, with some reporting marked 
success. A leading example is in the Tar-Pamlico River, North Carolina, overseen by state 
Environmental Management Commission. In that watershed, a group of fourteen point 
source dischargers belonging to the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association are treated as a single 
unit for pollution accounting purposes. An annual loadings cap is established for the 
group as a whole rather than individual caps for each enterprise. The Association 
members can transact point source-point source trades amongst themselves at negotiated 
prices; or if exceeding the collective cap is necessary, they can purchase credits from 
nonpoint sources. The nonpoint source credits were originally paid for with a $29 per
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kilogram contribution to the “state agriculture cost share fund” which supports 
implementation of best management practices on agriculture lands. This amount was 
determined by multiplying the mid-range cost of anaerobic lagoon installation ($ 13/kg 
nitrogen reduced) by a safety factor of two, and adding a standard ten percent 
administrative cost (Tippett and Dodd 1995). The cost to buy a unit of pollution credit 
has increased to $56/kg (TMDL Case Study). This trading structure is particularly 
administration-intensive, requiring to weekly effluent monitoring for total nitrogen, total 
phosphorus, and flow.
This trading program in the Tar-Pamlico has been in existence since 1991 and has 
already exhibited success. Through operational improvements, the Association has 
reduced its nutrient discharges by 28% despite flow increase of 18%. So far, only point- 
point trades have occurred, but the Association predicts that nonpoint source credits will 
be purchased during the next phase of the program. In addition to the environmental 
benefits from the program, “without trading, the Association estimates it would cost its 
members an average of $7 million in plant upgrades to achieve a comparable level of 
nutrient reduction that a $1 million investment in nonpoint source controls provides” 
(“Draft Trading Update” 1996).
Three projects in Colorado use similar approaches to nutrient reduction. In the 
Lake Dillon reservoir project, officials credit the trading program with encouraging 
cooperative management and reducing phosphorus loads from 3748 kg/year to 529 
kg/year (some of the highest removal capability in the nation) through improved operating 
efficiency at wastewater treatment plants. Towns also create credits when they convert
individual septic systems to public sewers. The Lake Dillon program itself has changed 
focus and now primarily provides opportunity for new nonpoint sources to offset impacts 
by adding Best Management Practices (BMPs) to older nonpoint source sites.
In a similar project at Cherry Creek Basin (CO), the program has experienced no 
trades thus far. However, the Cherry Creek Basin Authority has established a phosphorus 
total maximum daily load (TMDL) and assigned wasteload allocations to the watershed’s 
twelve wastewater treatment plants. The Authority will conduct nonpoint source water 
quality improvement projects to generate phosphorus credits that it can transfer to 
individual dischargers through a trade pool.
In the case of Boulder Creek, CO, the stream suffered from ammonia toxicity that 
could not be remedied simply through upgrades at Boulder’s municipal wastewater 
treatment plant. This project implemented additional BMP’s to restore the stream's 
integrity. Costs for the program have been $1.4 million, which reflect $3 to $7 million in 
capital cost savings by avoiding upgrade to full nitrification at Boulder’s wastewater 
treatment plant. Most importantly, environmental improvements have been realized 
including balanced pH and temperature, decrease in non-ionized ammonia, and better 
habitat quality (“Draft Trading Update 1996).
ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS OF TRADING
Different economic analysis tools yield varying solutions for the appropriate level 
of pollution control. One could evaluate the overall benefit to society of water quality
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improvements and compare this to the costs of achieving certain nutrient standards. Such 
a large-scale evaluation would be labor intensive but could also fail to yield a justifiable 
solution. Lack of complete specification could indicate inaccurate ratios, of the social 
costs of pollution to landowners’ (private) benefits from control installation (Milon 1987). 
However, as long as assumptions are clearly presented and results are qualified, economic 
models can yield important information about a system.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Weimer and Vining (1989) describe the cost-benefit analysis process as having 
four steps: “1. identifying relevant impacts, 2. monetizing impacts, 3. discounting for time 
and risk, and 4. choosing among policies.” This first step involves identification of all 
impacts, internal or external. In this systematic process, the costs and benefits are fully 
evaluated and compared on an equivalent basis. The authors note that “[the] 
appropriateness [of cost-benefit analysis] as a decision rule depends on whether efficiency 
is the only relevant value and the extent to which important impacts can be monetized.” 
Cost-benefit analysis of water quality should address more than efficiency and has several 
components that are difficult to identify, much less monetize.
Hence, the strategy shifts from cost-benefit to cost-effectiveness -  determining the 
least-cost solution to a pre-determined environmental goal. If the goal is to achieve a 
certain level of bottom water dissolved oxygen, then economic analysis focuses on 
determining the lowest cost to achieve it. Under a cost-effectiveness analysis, benefits are 
not analyzed categorically. One assumes instead that benefits from various approaches
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which achieve the same goal are essentially equal.
The cost of pollution reduction program is measured as cost to the producer of 
reducing units of emission by technology improvement, pretreatment, or avoidance. While 
cost per unit is usually measured as average cost -  total cost divided by number of units, 
or marginal cost -  cost of one additional unit of reduction, the EPA recommends a third 
type of accounting, incremental cost, as the most appropriate method of measuring costs 
associated with trades. Incremental cost is the average cost only of the additional 
reduction units. To measure this, one divides the total cost of remaining reductions by the 
number of units of additional reduction. This procedure avoids the problems associated 
with the aforementioned traditional cost measurements, as average cost assumes that 
preexisting and future reduction units are equal in cost, while marginal cost incorrectly 
assumes that pollution reduction could be approached in small units like a pound at a time. 
Producers will have an incentive to trade if they perceive a high incremental cost 
associated with further pollution reduction (“Draft” 1996).
Initial Allocation
Specifying the pattern of initial permit allocation is one of the fundamental 
preliminary determinations when designing a trading scheme. Several structures are 
available including an auction with a single clearing price, a Groves-type auction1 where 
truthful disclosure is in the best interest of the companies, or free initial distribution of 
rights according to current discharge levels. Lyon’s (1982) analysis of a simulation in the
1 A Groves mechanism is a “class of public-goods preference revelation mechanisms.”
13
Lake Michigan basin indicates the importance of incentive-compatibility (eliciting 
information from companies regarding bids, costs, and loads, that has not been 
manipulated). An incentive-compatible program requires less government intervention 
and has more stable outcomes. However, after a complete analysis Lyon finds that despite 
the potential for misrepresentation in free initial allocation, this strategy yielded least-cost 
solutions and was closest to Pareto optimality2.
Tietenburg (1989) also supports the allotment of future permits based on current 
discharges rather than auctions. He admits that allocating permits to existing firms and 
requiring new firms to bargain for pollution privileges seems at first biased. However, this 
tends to be a more politically palatable arrangement since existing sources “vote” while 
future ones do not.
Other authors do not agree that free allocation is the best solution, and claim 
instead that a permit is essentially a property right or permission to discharge. They find 
that companies should be forced to internalize the cost of the privilege, which is a valuable 
asset to the company (Hahn 1989). Additionally, Hahn argues that as regulatory 
limitations increase, the value of a permit to the holder increases as well. Hence, 
companies should view permits as investments for the future and be willing to purchase 
them at fair market price.
Market Dynamics
Another initial parameter is ensuring that enough dischargers would be willing to
2 Pareto optimality implies an equilibrium situation where no individual or company could be made better off 
without making another worse off.
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participate in order to create a healthy and diversified market, since trading relies on the 
existence of a variety across marginal costs of pollution reduction. Often, polluters see a 
fine for non-compliance simply as a “production cost” which is easily internalized, so there 
is no incentive to experiment with a new system. For this reason, it may be necessary to 
change the fine structure so that trading is identified as the preferred option. Ideally, not 
only would the permit price be less than the fine, but nitrogen inputs would also be 
decreased which is environmentally preferable to the fine option when limits are still 
exceeded. Currently, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality does not 
regularly issue fines for companies that exceed permit limits. Instead, they concentrate on 
injunctive relief and “behavior modification” by requiring retrofits (DEQ compliance 
officer, personal communication 9-17-98).
As stated previously, under uniform treatment regulations (command and control), 
marginal costs of reduction vary across dischargers, but each is required to accomplish
s.
equal percentages of reductions. Under a trading scheme, the reduction units are 
reallocated until marginal reduction costs are roughly equal. In this way, the first order 
condition for minimum aggregate treatment costs is satisfied (Lyons 1982).
WATER QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS
Nitrogen and Its Behavior in the Watershed
Total nitrogen (dissolved, particulate, organic, inorganic) is the most 
comprehensive measure of nitrogen loadings. The primary forms of nitrogen found in a
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waterway are nitrate (N03), ammonium (NH4), degradable organic nitrogen (BOD), living 
organic nitrogen (plankton), and dead refractory organic nitrogen (ORN). Each nitrogen 
species has a different behavior pathway in the water column, and the transformation from 
one species to another is primarily microbially mediated. Ammonium is oxidized through 
nitrification by chemoautotrophic bacteria, resulting in nitrate. The nitrification rate is 
temperature dependent, and the process depends upon a supply of dissolved oxygen. The 
denitrification process results in a loss of nitrogen in the system when nitrate is reduced by 
facultative anaerobic bacteria that use N 03 for respiration. The end product is primarily 
nitrogen gas. This nitrogen gas can be “fixed” by nitrogen-fixing bacteria which return it 
to a biologically available state (Libes 1992).
Dissolved ammonium can be adsorbed onto suspended sediment particles which 
then sink to the river bed. Dissolved NH4 and NO3 also provide nitrogen for algal growth. 
Phytoplankton advection and settling depend upon the flow rate and the concentration of 
organisms is taken up. Algal death transforms living matter to dead refractory nitrogen, 
phosphorus, carbon, and degradable organic matter. Hence nutrient transport in a system 
depends upon the nutrient form, length of transport, nutrient limitation, and presence of 
nutrient reservoirs (Watershed Model 1994).
Nutrient Limitation
In the Chesapeake Bay, nitrogen and phosphorus both fuel phytoplankton growth. 
When large quantities of excess phytoplankton die and degrade, the result is critically low 
bottom water dissolved oxygen (DO) and eutrophication. One goal of nutrient reduction
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strategies is to maintain sustainable bottom water DO throughout the year. In a waterway 
where the mass ratio of Dissolved Inorganic Nitrogen (DIN) to Dissolved Inorganic 
Phosphorus (DIP) is greater than about 7.2 (the Redfield ratio for the composition of 
marine algal cells), a phosphorus limited environment is indicated. In the northern three- 
quarters of the Bay, the system is considered phosphorus limited, meaning that 
phosphorus concentrations control the primary production of phytoplankton. The 
southern-most quarter is considered nitrogen limited throughout the year, and in fall, the 
nitrogen limited conditions creep about halfway up the Bay mainstem (“Response” 1994). 
When an area is nitrogen limited, phytoplankton nitrogen utilization rates are dependent 
on additional nitrogen inputs to the system. In some cases it is necessary to know the 
nutrient limitation situation of an area so that policy will provide the desired environmental 
effects.
The model of a Bay-wide, phosphorus-only restriction indicates benefit to the 
phosphorus limited upper Bay regions but increase in phytoplankton production in the 
lower Bay. As phosphorus loads are reduced (with constant nitrogen load), the excess 
nitrogen not taken up in phytoplankton biomass is transported through surface waters to 
the nitrogen-limited lower Bay. This excess nitrogen stimulates phytoplankton production 
which eventually settles and creates increased sediment oxygen demand downstream.
Thus, while phosphorus removal is most beneficial in the upper Bay, nitrogen reduction is 
important throughout the Bay both for the direct improvements in the middle and lower 
regions as well as the indirect avoidance of excess nitrogen transport from the upper 
regions (“Response” 1994).
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Nitrogen also has a direct impact on submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) habitat. 
Since SAV provides nursery and spawning grounds for fish, food for marine organisms, 
and oxygenation to the water column, the health of SAV beds dictates the health of the 
entire system. These submerged plants thrive best when dissolved inorganic nitrogen 
(DIN) in mesohaline and polyhaline environments is less than 0.15 mg/1 during the annual 
growth period. Additionally, there is an indirect impact when phytoplankton biomass 
decreases light penetration and limits shallow water plant growth. The light extinction 
coefficient used in Chesapeake Bay water quality modeling is directly proportional to 
phytoplankton biomass. The models of SAV response to nutrient reduction indicate a less 
dramatic benefit from phosphorus-only reductions than from equivalent nitrogen 
reductions (“Response” 1994).
Dissolved Oxygen
When bottom waters reach dissolved oxygen (DO) levels below 1 mg/L, the water 
condition is considered anoxic. During the summer, surface waters are often DO 
saturated by algal production while bottom waters are oxygen sinks because of the 
oxidation of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) and the chemical oxygen demand of reduced 
sediment resuspensions. Once again, reducing total nitrogen improves water column DO 
conditions more than equivalent reductions of phosphorus (“Response” 1994).
Estuarine Circulation
Estuarine circulation refers to the typical flow pattern of water in estuarine
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systems, which is driven by the interaction of fresh water and salt water. Since the higher 
salinity water has a greater density, it will tend to “sink” to the bottom of the water 
column. Meanwhile the lighter fresh water comes out in a seaward “wedge” to overlay 
the saline intrusion. A cross-sectional diagram of the estuary would indicate landward 
flow of higher salinity water in the bottom waters and seaward flow of fresher water 
nearer the surface. This circulation pattern and the degree of vertical stratification it 
imparts has implications for the oxygenation of the system.
The James River is described as a “partially-mixed estuary.” This means that the 
vertical density differential is not strong enough to regularly limit vertical mixing, thereby 
indicating that hypoxia is not predicted to be an overwhelming problem. Additionally, 
gravitational circulation carries nutrients up the estuary, so when a bloom occurs the 
hypoxic region (due to phytoplankton degradation) will be just landward of the bloom 
location. In some systems, the water column is so stratified that oxygen will not diffuse 
down from the surface and a hypoxic system will go anoxic. This could happen when 
there is an increased freshwater flow which creates a stronger pycnocline and inhibits 
vertical exchange. Based on the model of gravitational circulation, hypoxia is possible, 
but not likely, in a partially-mixed estuary like the James River (Kuo and Nielson 1987).
Best Management Practices
A Best Management Practice (BMP) is a technology-based standard for nutrient 
reduction. Projects are designed to achieve certain environmental conditions, and efforts 
are focused on pre-project specifications rather than measuring only end results. The cost
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effectiveness of a BMP depends on the pre-existing nutrient control practice, the use 
intensity on the site, and sometimes the desired water quality. Descriptions of specific Best 
Management Plans for nonpoint sources follow in Table 1.
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Table 1. Best Management Practices
Source: York River Tributary Strategy, 1998.
Shoreline Erosion Control Structural (riprap, revetments) or 
nonstructural (marsh grass, vegetative 
buffer) components to reduce loss of 
sediment and nutrients into a waterway
Septic System Management Regular pumping of systems, installation of 
denitrification components, or bypassing 
existing septic system and connecting to 
sanitary sewer
Urban Nutrient Management Educational efforts to reduce lawn chemical 
use in residential areas
Retrofits for Urban Best Management 
Practices
Enhancing existing stormwater management 
systems to slow runoff, remove sediment 
and nutrients, and restore eroding stream 
channels
Erosion and Sediment Control Practices such as silt fences, sediment 
basins, and check dams reduce not only 
sediment but also associated nutrient runoff
Grassed Filter Strips Vegetative buffers adjacent to streams 
which filter runoff from surrounding lands
Cover Crops Fall planting of crops such as rye, wheat, or 
barley without fertilizer in order to trap 
nitrogen left over in the soil from the 
planting season; also reduces winter-time 
erosion of soils
Grazing Land Protection Rotational grazing practices which minimize 
effects of livestock on land
Agricultural Land Retirement Ceasing to farm on highly erodible or 
sensitive lands -  taking land out of 
production or grazing and planting instead 
with a permanent vegetative cover (grass, 
shrubs, or trees)
Nutrient Management Planning Managing the timing, amount, and 
placement of fertilizer application to 
minimize nutrient loss potential
Farm Plans Control practices to limit sediment runoff 
from land through comprehensive natural 
resource management plans
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Conservation Tillage Crop production method that leaves the 
maximum crop residue on the ground -  can 
be done either by planting without tilling 
(no-till) or tilling in a manner or direction 
that limits nutrient and sediment runoff
Stream Protection from Livestock Installing streambank stabilization 
equipment or fencing to exclude livestock 
from directly entering the stream
For point sources, the major nutrient management technologies are categorized as 
either biological nutrient removal (BNR) processes or non-biological nutrient removal 
processes. The biological processes are composed of a nitrification component whereby 
ammonium and organic nitrogen are converted to nitrate under aerobic conditions, and a 
denitrification component wherein these nitrates are converted to nitrogen gas under 
anoxic conditions. New technologies have been designed to remove both nitrogen and 
phosphorus, making them particularly cost-effective. In these processes, wastewater 
passes through tanks which are anaerobic, anoxic, and aerobic, in order to accelerate the 
microbially-mediated processes. These BNR systems are distributed under trade names 
including A/O and A20™, Bardenpho™, Biolac™, Phostrip™, and the University of 
Capetown process. On the other hand, the non-biological nutrient removal systems 
involve adding chemicals or other treatments to wastewater for nutrient removal. These 
include breakpoint chlorination, electrodialysis, electrochemical treatment, and distillation. 
These non-biological procedures have been used primarily for phosphorus removal 
(“Nutrient Reduction Strategy Reevaluation Report #8 1993).
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POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION
Social Benefits
Trading provides the opportunity to develop consensus-building efforts. By 
providing an integrated watershed approach, all of the “stakeholders” on the waterway are 
included in a collective project. For example, the Tar-Pamlico program was developed as 
a coordination effort of the Tar-Pamlico Association (point source entities in the basin), 
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Pamlico-Tar River Foundation, and the North 
Carolina Division of Environmental Management (Hall 1996). The process then becomes 
a local-regional initiative, bringing regulatory measures down to a manageable scale. The 
goal is not only cost-effectiveness but also efficiency and inclusiveness.
Implementation Timeframe
The Tar-Pamlico project used a phased implementation with Phase I outlined as 
three years of nutrient information development, identifying point source upgrades, 
evaluating the nonpoint source program, creating infrastructure, and developing a 
specialized GIS watershed model of the estuary. The second phase would then enable 
nonpoint source trades and build management tools (TMDL Case Study). In general, 
programs which have gradual implementation time frames have the benefit of more 
stakeholder interaction, goals in line with actual conditions, and more willing participation
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since there is time to become familiar with a new concept.
Program Design
In designing a trading program, it is necessary to determine the optimum level along the 
spectrum from strict regulation to unrestricted free market. While strict regulation does 
provide more reliable outcomes, it may hinder the system from realizing maximal 
efficiency. For example, regulatory or organizational constraints on some discharging 
entities may not allow them to behave as competitive firms in a market (Tietenburg 1989). 
However, a free market system could reduce the regulatory oversight to the point that 
efficiency becomes unrestricted chaos. Additionally, a system which claims to be free- 
market, but is simply command and control disguised in trading language, can not fully 
realize the benefits of the free market. It is important for individual programs to determine 
a sustainable amount of oversight, along with free trade elements.
Legal Issues
There are numerous legal issues that could affect the selection of regulatory policy 
alternatives. Takings cases now require landowner compensation when legislated land 
decisions are equivalent to removing economically viable land uses. The legal and 
planning communities are also currently examining the option of Tradable Development 
Permits (TDP’s) as a means of protecting some areas from concentrated development. 
Some of this information can be extrapolated and applied to the specific conditions of 
coastal lands.
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Company participation is another legal issue. In most situations, participation in the 
trading program is voluntary, although most point source dischargers are expected to find 
the scheme an attractive option compared to more expensive fines. It may be necessary to 
codify the framework for trading in state law since industry may be hesitant to participate 
in the program that they could cease to be legal. For example, in the Pamlico-Tar River 
Foundation’s 1996 comments of the Draft Framework, the membership indicated that 
although the program as a whole was exhibiting success, two shortfalls were the lack of 
inclusion into state law and no clear mandate. The Lake Dillon project report noted that 
part of its strength was codification of the 1984 Dillon control regulations adopted by the 
State (Colorado) Water Control Commission (Draft Trading Update 1996).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Two years before publication of the EPA draft, Crutchfield et al (1994) evaluated 
coastal watersheds for feasibility of point-nonpoint source trading programs. They used 
data from the National Coastal Pollutant Discharge Inventory (NCPDI) and the National 
Resources Inventory (NRI) for 350 USGS cataloging units, each covering all or part of a 
surface drainage basin or distinct hydrologic feature.
This study used three screening criteria to evaluate the potential for point-nonpoint 
trading and developed a cumulative screening process so that only those watersheds 
meeting the first criterion were tested for the second and third criteria. First, the 
watersheds needed to have a significant portion of total loadings from point source (PS)
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and agricultural nonpoint source (NPS), since “if either the agricultural NPS or the PS 
share of total loadings is small, then trading is unlikely to contribute much to water quality 
improvement.” They determined the screening limit of 30% of loadings for each pollutant 
(nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment) by both PS and NPS, and thirty-five watersheds met 
this initial requirement for at least one pollutant. The Virginia watersheds qualifying at 
this level were the Lower Rappahannock and the Chowan3 (shared with NC). The James 
and York Rivers did not qualify under the pollution loading distribution criteria, but 
neither did the Tar-Pamlico where trading has met considerable success. Hence, this is an 
indication that the authors’ first criteria may have been incorrectly specified.
The second screening level required that there be a few PS’s of significant size, 
because numerous small sources would present intractable transaction costs. Of the 
thirty-five first-round qualifiers, this level identified those watersheds where the total 
loadings of the five largest PS’s contribute at least 75% of each category. The third level 
selected those areas where the trading program would be able to reduce NPS pollution by 
converting to a less-polluting land use or installing new technologies. Thus, the screening 
program looked for areas where water quality enhancing practices were not already in 
place but where there was an identifiable need for them. Because levels two and three 
assessed the PS and NPS sides respectively, all thirty-five of the watersheds identified in 
the first round were assessed through steps two and three. Crutchfield’s study found only 
one watershed where this particular screening process yielded a “High” potential for 
successful trading, and eight units were of “Medium” potential. This “High” potential was
3 The author misspelled this river as the “Ghowan” throughout the article. However, there is no river with that 
name, and he was clearly referring to the location of the Chowan.
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found in Severn River, MD, and the Lower Rappahannock and Chowan received “Low” 
and “Medium” scores, respectively.
Analysis of the methods and results of this publication yields several lessons for 
this study. First, in their conclusion the authors did note that their intent to broadly 
identify coastal watersheds had required them “to forgo some detail for the sake of our 
national scope,” and they recommended further research on a local level. Additionally, the 
first screening criterion may have been too restrictive, since it eliminated 90% of the 
watersheds, including some where successful trading programs have already been 
implemented.
Another study by Krupnick of Resources for the Future (1989) evaluated the 
potential of tradable nutrient permits in the more focused region of the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed. The author noted that the in the Chesapeake Bay Agreement (1987) the states 
of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia committed to 
reduce nutrient loadings to the Bay by forty percent by the year 2000. A 40% reduction 
should increase dissolved oxygen (DO) levels to 1 mg/1 in the bottom waters of the 
mainstem Bay. In the original plan, reductions would be allocated according to each 
state’s share of baseline loads of “controllable” nitrogen and phosphorus, with each state 
required to reduce its loadings by 40%. Although the Agreement did not specifically 
mention trading as an option for compliance, Krupnick's model evaluated a “nutrient 
reduction credit (NRC)” system whereby permits were traded between states rather than 
between sources. Krupnick also mentioned some of the potential problems of permit 
programs including coordination difficulties, lack of baseline data, locational effects
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(reductions below the “fall line” have more effect at the mouth than those above it), and 
the imperfect substitutability between nitrogen and phosphorus. The author concluded 
that while a source-based incentive policy on this scale would be onerous if not 
impossible, there was some theoretical support for state trading. However, he did indicate 
that “gains in efficiency from state trading may be relatively modest if they are limited to 
those arising only from interstate trades.”
Krupnick presented two options for the design of trades. The first was a “load 
based trading system. . . with some simple modifications for locational and source-type 
differences.” While allowing for a simpler structure, this option incorporated some 
uncertainty regarding whether environmental goals would be met. On the other hand, 
policy-makers could hold environmental improvement as the ultimate measurement which 
would require models of nutrient flows above the fall line and their effect on the mainstem 
Bay, nutrient flux out of sediments, and nutrient “exhaustion,” in order to fully understand 
the implications of specific trades (“The Bay Model”). A clear problem with the second 
approach is that the models are often based on uncertainty and cannot reliably predict 
effects.
The most obvious criticism of Krupnick’s model is the small number of actors 
(four) and the large geographic scale. It appears that true efficiency improvements will 
only be achieved through intrastate trades where the states maximize the credits each can 
provide by concentrating on lower-cost pollution reducers. At such a large scale, it is 
quite possible that entire watersheds will be overlooked or deemed “pollution inflow” 
areas. Despite its unwieldy scale, Krupnick provides a very comprehensive economic
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analysis of the trading procedure that will be most helpful if adapted to a watershed level.
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PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Problem
This project evaluates the feasibility of applying a pollution trading scheme to 
Virginia’s James River Watershed. The James River’s 450 mile reach runs through large 
areas of agricultural land. Portions of its reach have been identified as imperiled 
(particularly near its mouth in the Elizabeth River portion), and it has point source 
dischargers of considerable size in Richmond and in Hampton Roads. At first glance, the 
James River satisfies several criteria for trading.
Currently, the states in the Chesapeake Bay watershed are committed to nutrient 
reductions of 40% of 1985 levels by the year 2000 (1987 Chesapeake Bay Agreement) in 
the face of increasing population growth and intensification of agriculture and industry. 
The James provides the third largest nitrogen load to the Bay; the Susquehanna and the 
Potomac have the first and second highest discharges (“Response” 1994. In the case of 
the James River, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality has committed to 
improving ambient water quality in the river itself rather than focusing primarily on 
interstate agreements to protect and improve the Bay estuary. While nutrient loadings 
from the James are significant, the river runoff is carried primarily out to the Atlantic, 
thereby influencing shelf processes. Hence, the James actually contributes little to 
mainstem Bay water quality due to its position near the ocean margin of the Bay 
(“Response” 1994). However, it is still in Virginia’s interest to improve water quality 
within the river’s reach and to contribute even small improvements to the Chesapeake
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waters.
In order to simplify the model, and since nitrogen and phosphorus are not perfect 
substitutes, only nitrogen will be described in this project. Nitrogen is currently the 
nutrient of concern; its reduction is crucial to the status of the entire Bay region. 
Additionally, the James River lies in the nitrogen limited region where elimination of 
additional discharges could prevent harmful algal blooms. Once future research 
establishes an appropriate ratio between nitrogen and phosphorus, then the region can 
implement an effective reduction strategy for the health of the entire Bay and address the 
two nutrients together.
Additionally, the Progress Report of the Bay wide Nutrient Reduction Reevaluation
(1992) indicates that 80% of the 43.7 million pounds of nitrogen is “controllable load,” 
although this relies upon the determination that 99% of the point source load and 58% of 
nonpoint source load is controllable. In 1996, 64% of the nitrogen load in the river came 
from point sources, 21% from agriculture, 18% from urban, and 4% from septic (James 
River Tributary Strategy, 1998).
Table 2. Nitrogen Loadings in the Janies River Watershed (million pounds).
Source: “Achieving the Chesapeake Bay Nutrient Goals” (1994).
Nitrogen Phosphorus
1985 base year 43.7 6.18
1992 progress 39.7 4.26
2000 allocation cap 29.6 4.04
Remaining reduction 14.8 0.92
Tributary strategy 14.8 1.53
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Table 2 provides nitrogen loading data for the James River Watershed. While the 
tributary strategy indicates that it can address the full shortfall of nitrogen reductions, this 
may be at a high cost due to the regulatory structure. The current reduction strategy is 
based on a “command and control” structure is be more straightforward but relies upon 
costly point source reduction of nutrients. Some policy analysts argue that only by taking 
advantage of the more cost effective nonpoint source reductions, even though they are 
more difficult to quantify, will the Bay states most efficiently reach the nutrient reduction 
goals. As the system nears the goal of nitrogen reduction, the marginal cost of each 
additional unit reduction will increase. This will make further progress increasingly 
expensive, and perhaps impossible4.
Data
The identity of each point source discharger (wastewater treatment plants, 
industrial, manufacturing) was obtained through NPDES permits which are catalogued in 
EPA’s Permit Compliance System. Additionally, data from the Virginia Department of 
Environmental Quality provided information regarding whether these sources had 
achieved Biological Nutrient Removal (BNR), which is considered the state of the art best 
management practice in the field. The specific nitrogen discharge quantities (pounds per 
year) for permits in the watershed were acquired through the Chesapeake Bay Program 
Office for each year from 1985 to 1996. Most researchers consider this point source 
pollution to be 100% controllable. While this may seem economically impractical, there is
4 In addition to point source and nonpoint sources of nitrogen, there is also atmospheric deposition. However, 
due to the uncertainties concerning quantity and behavior, this component was omitted from the current model.
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no defensible background or in-between level at which a plant could operate. Hence this 
project will follow rationale that point sources are fully expendable. In economic terms 
this may be supported as well since a firm offered a very large compensation may be 
willing to go out of business or suspend operation for a particular period of time.
The cost per unit reduction for point sources came primarily from the Chesapeake 
Bay Program Office publication (Report #8 1993) which presented results from a 1989 
CH2M Hill study. A disclaimer with the figure indicates that they are accurate within +50 
percent to -30 percent, but they embody the best information currently available. This 
study report examined large wastewater treatment plants and provided Equivalent Annual 
Costs (EAC), annualized capital costs plus yearly operation and maintenance, using a 10% 
interest rate and an expected 20 year project life. These costs were given for the 
technology necessary to reach the water quality criteria similar to that which is projected 
with the 40 percent reduction. The standard of nutrient removal was a seasonal 10mg/l 
total nitrogen level, and total phosphorus 2.0 mg/1 or less5. The technology used varied by 
plant, but mostly consisted of nitrification/denitrification with two anoxic zones or a 
nitrogen trickling filter with a denitrification filter.
Assuming a uniform regulation scenario (Lyon 1982), 40% of each company’s 
1985 loads was subtracted from 1989 loads in order to identify discharge reduction goals. 
The Chesapeake Bay Agreement does not specifically mandate that each point source 
must reduce 40% of its loads. An assumption of this project, however, is that under 
command and control the reductions would be allocated equally across all entities subject
5 A year-round TN of 10mg/l is expected to maintain an average annual performance effluent level of TN=7 
mg/1.
33
to regulation (point sources). Reduction goals have not been identified specifically for the 
James but the “James River Tributary Strategy” (1998) states that, “Just like the forty 
percent reduction for the entire Bay, the nutrient and sediment goals [for the James] will 
be based on the results of sophisticated computer modeling . .
The following companies had already reduced discharges by 40% in 1989: 
Hoechst-Celanese, Fort Eustis STP, Allied Signal, Falling Creek (Chesterfield Co.) STP, 
South Central Wastewater Authority (Petersburg), and Babcock & Wilcox. These 
reductions resulted from production changes at Babcock & Wilcox and Allied Signal, 
installation of seasonal biological nutrient removal at Falling Creek, and upgrading and 
expanding to provide advanced secondary treatment in Petersburg. In addition, several 
other plants have implemented reduction technology. Lynchburg STP has replaced an 
Zimpro sludge heat treatment process which had contributed to process inefficiency, 
Henrico installed BNR capability, and the Virginia Initiative Plant installed BNR and 
patented a removal process which is being made available to other plants without royalty 
payment. In addition, the Richmond plant added nitrification capacity and is pilot testing 
methanol addition (James Tributary Strategy 1998).
In the next step, the Equivalent Annual Cost (EAC) was divided by the number of 
pounds still remaining to be reduced. It is important to note that the size of this cost per 
unit reduction figure has much to do with the number of pounds remaining rather than 
simply high cost. However, since cost was calculated relative to achieving the goal from 
1989 levels, this provides at least a relative comparison of costs. For point sources not in 
this report, a $20 cost was extrapolated from estimates of BNR costs on the Potomac
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River (Kerns 1996). The cost per unit reduction is shown in Appendix III.
The nonpoint source loading distributions were calculated from the 1996 EPA 
Region III Land Cover GIS Data Set which has multi-resolution land characteristics 
(MRLC). This was the most recent land use data available so it was considered to be the 
“current” distribution of land use and nonpoint source loadings. The James River 
watershed was clipped, using Arclnfo commands, from the Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
coverage. The original land use categories were re-combined as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. EPA MRLC Land Cover Categories Recombined.
Water = Water
Urban = Low intensity urban + High intensity urban
Hay/Pasture = Hay/Pasture
Ag/Till = Row Crop + Probably Row Crop
Forest = Coniferous Forest + Mix Forest + Deciduous Forest
Wetlands = Wooded Wetlands + Emergent Wetlands
Barren = Barren Quarry + Barren Beach + Barren Coal + Barren Transitional
In this way, the fifteen EPA categories were condensed into the seven most useful 
for the project. Of these seven, water, forest, wetlands, and barren were eliminated from 
consideration since they are considered “background” or non-controllable sources of 
nitrogen loadings. Figures 1,2, and 3 show the land use coverages for each section of the 
watershed. A Chesapeake Bay Program table in the “Nutrient Reduction Strategy 
Reevaluation Report #8” (1993) provided “Edge-of-Stream Nitrogen Loading Factors by 
Land Use Category” from the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Base Case Scenario. In 
order to come up with a reasonable estimation of nitrogen loadings, only those hydrologic
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units directly adjacent to a stretch of the main channel were quantified. Loadings from 
more distant hydrologic units would need to be corrected for topographic features or soil 
types, and such factors were not available. Of the one hundred-nine total units in the 
watershed, twenty-nine of these were selected as adjacent. The selected hydrologic units 
are depicted on the watershed coverage in Figure 4. The GIS coverage units were 
transformed from meters squared to acres and then the number of acres of each land use in 
each hydrologic unit was multiplied by the loading factor. The loading factors are as 
follows:
Urban = 8 lbs/acre/yr
Hay/Pasture = 7 lbs/acre/yr
Till =19 lbs/acre/yr
As an additional reference point for these figures, the forested “background loadings” rate 
is 2.5 lbs/acre/year. Together, the estimates for loadings from these three sources in the 
designated hydrologic units total 8,921,971 lbs/yr, which reflects 22% of the Chesapeake 
Bay Program Model’s estimated nitrogen loadings to the James River of 39.7 million 
pounds. Additionally, the percentage of each land use in the selected segments is roughly 
proportional to the published data for the whole watershed.
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Figure 1. Land Use/Land Cover and Point Source Discharge in the Coastal Plain of
the Janies River Watershed.
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Figure 2. Land Use/Land Cover and Point Source Discharge in the Piedmont
Region of the James River Watershed.
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Figure 3. Land Use/Land Cover and Point Source Discharge in the Mountain
Region of the Janies River Watershed.
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Land Use/Land Cover and Point Source Discharge 
in the Mountain Region of the James River Watershed
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Figure 4. James River Hydrologic Units.
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The next step was to determine the “controllable” loads of each source. The York 
River Initial Tributary Nutrient Reduction Strategy (July 1998) listed BMP efficiencies 
from the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model (Phase IV). The efficiencies for applicable 
practices under each land use category were averaged to determine efficiency estimates. 
The 33% efficiency for urban BMPs was an average from Erosion and Sediment Controls, 
Stormwater Management Retrofits (Extended Detention (dry), Pond-Wetland System (in 
series), Stormwater Wetland, Retention (wet), Conversion from dry to wet, and Sand 
Filters), Septic Systems (Septic Pumping, Septic Connections, Septic Denitrification), and 
Urban Nutrient Management. The 35% for Hay/Pasture was an average from Hay and 
Pasture Farm Plans, Grazing Land Protection, Nutrient Management, and Streambank 
Protection with and without fencing. Finally, the 21% nitrogen reduction for Till came 
from Agricultural Crop Farm Plans for conventional or conservation till, Nutrient 
Management, and Cover Crops.6 Current nitrogen loads were multiplied by the 
corresponding efficiencies to determine the maximum controllable load in each hydrologic 
unit. The results indicated the maximum pounds of nitrogen available for purchase as 
BMP credit in each hydrologic unit.
Cost per unit reduction was derived for nonpoint source much in the way that 
efficiencies were determined. The “Nutrient Reduction Strategy Reevaluation, Report #8”
(1993) outlined the cost per pound for various BMP technologies. These costs ranged 
from $2.40 for agricultural nutrient management to $103 for sediment retention and water 
control structures. The costs for BMP’s for each land use type were averaged, and BMP
6 It is important to note that while BMPs are available and fairly effective for animal waste control, this land 
use feature was not identifiable through land use designations or permits. This could be another area of
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costs per pound of reduction follows:
Urban =$61.25
Hay/Pasture = $5.43
Till = $2.58
When compared to the point source estimate of $20 per pound, the data are at least 
proportional to other studies. The Tar-Pamlico Association estimates that one unit of 
nonpoint source control with Best Management Practices costs roughly one-tenth of the 
cost for one unit from a wastewater treatment plant (TMDL Case Study).
The Model
Once all of the background information had been collected, experimentation could 
begin evaluating trading applications. The options currently available to a firm facing 
violations (pay fine, retrofit, install ponds) were supplemented with a trading option. A 
firm could either purchase a reduction credit from another point source that had a lower 
cost per unit reduction, or they could pay into a fund which subsidizes non-point source 
reductions (riparian buffers, alternative tillage, wetland creation). Once the parameters of 
the trading scheme are established, it is necessary to allow the market to function freely. 
However, very close monitoring will be necessary, especially in the early stages when 
actual outcomes are unpredictable.
The method chosen to predict and evaluate the effects of trading was a linear 
programming model which comes from the field of operations research. In this context, 
programming means “planning” in the sense of predicting that a system will behave in a
significant reduction in nitrogen loading.
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certain way. The method requires that several alternative choices exist, solutions are 
measured according to attainment of specific objectives, optimization, and examination of 
interrelationships between components are involved. The first component of the model is
relates the decision variables in the form X QXi, were Q is the cost of Xj under the given 
circumstances. Finally, the constraints are linear equations or inequalities which govern 
the options for the objective function. The goal of linear programming is to optimize 
(maximize or minimize) a certain function by changing the decision variables within the 
bounds of the constraints. In many cases, the goal is to find the minimum cost of a 
particular tableau of options given known costs and constraints on the total number of 
units of different types of X (Feiring 1986).
The Solver function in Microsoft’s Excel program is fitted to handle such linear 
programming exercises. The Excel Solver was developed by Frontline Systems for 
Microsoft. It uses spreadsheet formula language and solves by the “dense Simplex 
method” with bounds on the variables. It can handle up to 200 decision variables, which 
was adequate for this project (NEOS Guide). The benefit of this method is that it is 
readily available to policy analysts, straightforward, and inexpensive. The model is set up 
so that the user answers “minimize/maximize what equation, by changing what cells, 
according to what constraints?” The model can also be specified to “assume linear 
model” and be non-negative. The specific method used when running the model is shown 
in Appendix IX.
The linear programming technique has been used by several authors, including
the decision variables or “unknowns” (Xj). The second is the objective function which
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O’Neil et al (1983), in a project evaluating the potential for trading in the Fox River, 
Wisconsin. Here the commodity unit was dissolved oxygen (DO) in the waterway, and 
linear approximation defined the relationship between effluent quantity of several 
components and water quality. Relations of impact coefficients with flow and temperature 
were estimated using ordinary least square regression. O’Neil et al. indicated that as long 
as the program accounted for daily fluctuations of environmental conditions, a least-cost 
solution at market equilibrium could be realized. The difference in the current study is 
that it evaluates a single parameter which has multiple effects in the watershed system. 
However, concentration on a single nutrient, nitrogen, will enable use of a linear equation 
and eliminate some of the uncertainty. Although this model is unable to account for all 
variations in environmental conditions, it does include a correction for nitrogen cycling 
along the waterway which will be explained under the “transport coefficient” section.
Milon (1987) noted that most studies of nonpoint source reduction costs used a 
deterministic optimization (linear programming) model which assumes steady-state 
conditions. However, with nonpoint source loads related to weather events, he believed 
that a stochastic optimization model might more appropriately represent the variable 
nature of discharges. A stochastic model was applied to Honey Creek in the Lake Erie 
basin, Ohio. From this research, Milon concluded that including reliability requirements 
adds to the cost of attaining pollution reduction objectives. Additionally, he found that a 
single pollutant reduction program could have consequences in other areas (e.g. reduction 
of total phosphorus can leave excess nitrogen after phytoplankton production decreases). 
Ideally a comprehensive reduction program will have a multiple-objectives approach. In
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this project, linear programming was chosen for straightforwardness, realizing its 
limitations in modeling a real-life system accurately7.
Transport Coefficients
In its comments on the “Draft Framework” (1996), the Water Environment 
Federation claimed that “[ojne consideration favoring trading even without a TMDL is 
that the water body would be no worse off with trading than without trading so long as 
the total load does not increase.” While this may be true in part, it is also necessary to 
monitor the distribution of loadings so that a “dead zone” is not created in the river. This 
linear programming equation will incorporate control for water quality by using a 
transport factor for nitrogen.
The transport coefficient factor indicates the potential degradation of nitrogen 
along the waterway through biomass uptake, adsorption to particulates, nitrification, or 
denitrification. The transport factor can be linked to distance along the watershed, and 
each hydrologic unit is designated relative to its distance from the river’s mouth.
Reducing one unit of nitrogen at some point in the watershed may require more than one 
unit to be reduced upstream due to the natural riverine processes. One unit of pollution at 
an upstream point may only equal a fraction of one unit once it reaches a downstream 
point.
The transport factors for point sources were provided by the Virginia Department 
of Environmental Quality. They were extrapolated to apply to non-point sources as well,
7 As a result of data constraints, this LP model was constructed for a steady-state condition. However, dynamic 
optimization models are available for situations which require modeling multiple nutrients or when an
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according to hydrologic unit location. According to the data, one pound from the upper 
watershed would load 0.74 pounds of nitrogen at the mouth, and a pound of nitrogen in 
the piedmont region would load 0.89 pounds at the mouth8. East of the fall line, there is a 
unitary ratio between loadings at the source and loadings at the mouth. These ratios 
require multiplying pounds of nitrogen reduction required by 1.54 for the mountain region 
or 1.35 for the piedmont. Additionally, loadings from Farmville STP, due to its location 
on the Appomattox River (a James River tributary), were multiplied by 2.27 to account 
for additional nitrogen loss along that pathway. While Farmville was included in the 
evaluation since the specific loading factors was known, nonpoint loadings from that 
region were not.
For the purpose of deriving a straightforward model, initial restrictions will be 
placed on trading options so that a point source discharger in a permit-purchaser role 
would only be able to offset its excess discharge by compensations to upstream PS or NPS 
entities. The units of controllable nitrogen were multiplied by the cost per unit reduction 
for each land use type, and a total cost of reduction was obtained.
The objective function combines the costs per unit reduction for each type of land 
use for each hydrologic unit with the point source reductions and their associated cost. 
With the unknown variable being pounds of nitrogen reduced by each hydrologic unit, 
linear programming can solve for the minimum total cost, thereby determining the 
reduction distribution that minimizes the private cost of the program for a given point 
source increase. Assuming that the equation solution is constrained so that resulting
assessment through time is desired.
8 The DEQ figures are similar to those in the literature for the Potomac River where “69 percent to 91 percent
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reductions must equal the point source excess and the transport factor is incorporated, the
water quality impacts should be mitigated in this model.
The point source maximum reductions were calculated so that each point source 
must be in compliance with the Chesapeake Bay Agreement themselves before they can 
sell credits to other entities. Otherwise they would be receiving compensation to 
undertake already-mandated reductions. Hence the “maximum reduction” model 
constraint has two options. If the company had already met the 40% reduction level, then 
the maximum available for purchase is its 1996 loading value (current loadings). If they 
are still not in compliance, then only the optimal discharge quantity was available for credit 
sale (60% of 1985 levels). While not built into the model, a legislative restriction would 
require compliance or plans to comply with the Agreement before a point source could sell 
credits.
MODEL RESULTS
Lynchburg STP
The first model run was for Lynchburg STP, located in the Piedmont region. Lynchburg’s 
1996 nitrogen discharge was 671,680 pounds/year or 2.42 times the 40% reduction goal 
of 276,983 pounds. Hence, under the Chesapeake Bay Agreement, Lynchburg STP 
would have to reduce 394,697 pounds by the year 2000. Since specific data were not 
available for this plant, it was estimated to cost $20 per pound to implement BNR 
technology (Kerns 1996). If Lynchburg installed in-house control technology, compliance
of the nitrogen . . .  entering the Potomac above the fall line reached the Lower (tidal) Potomac” (Kerns).
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would cost $7,893,940. To determine the cost under trading, the reduction goal was 
placed into the linear programming model with the objective function being the sum of 
cost-per-unit-reductions multiplied by each available reduction options. The equation 
used is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Objective Function for Scenario with Lynchburg Held to 40% Reduction
Level, Point Source and Nonpoint Source Trades, and with Transport Coefficients.
= (U optimal h03)*(cpurU) + (HP optimal h03)*(cpur HP) + (T optimal h03)*(cpurT) + 
(optimal BWX)*(cpur BWX) + 1.12*[(U optimal h01)*(cpur U)+ (HP optimal 
h01)*(cpurHP) + (T optimal h01)*(cpurT)] + 1.12*[SUM(U optimal i03 : U optimal 
i28)*(cpurU) + (SUM(HP optimal i03 : HP optimal i28)*(cpurHP) + (SUM(T optimal i03 
: T optimal i28)*(cpurT)] + 1.12*[(optimal Lees)*(cpurLees) + (optimal 
Lexington) *(cpurLexington) + (optimal BuenaVista)*(cpurBuenaVista) + (optimal 
CliftonForge)*(cpurCliftonForge) + (optimal Covington) *(cpurCovington) + (optimal 
Westvaco)*(cpur Westvaco)]
U = Urban 
HP = Hay/Pasture 
T = Till
Optimal = quantity (pounds of nitrogen discharge) reduced at optimum/equilibrium 
Model “unknowns” (decision variables) constrained as:
0 <= BWX optimal <= BWX maximum reduction
cpur = cost per unit reduction
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The constraints mandated that the sum of units reduced equal the reduction goal, 
and reductions by each source could not exceed the maximum reductions described 
earlier. The model solution results (Appendix IV) indicated that in the optimal case, the 
394,697 pounds/year credit would be acquired from Till farming in each hydrologic unit 
west of Lynchburg as well as from Babcock and Wilcox and Covington STP in order to 
achieve the least cost solution.
The cost per unit reduction for Till, $2.58/pound/year, was the least expensive 
option overall. However, the hydrologic units (HUs) had different transport factors, and 
these affected the cost per unit reduction. HU h03 was the least expensive, since the 
transport factor was one. Hence, Till load from this unit was the first purchased. Next, 
Hay/Pasture loads were purchased in the same pattern. All units to the west (hOl and i03- 
i28) had a loading factor of 0.89 pounds to the Lynchburg region of the river. For each 
pound of nitrogen input upstream of h03, only 0.89 pound is expected to reach that 
segment. Hence, any source upstream which wanted to sell credits would have to reduce 
1.12 lbs of nitrogen for every pound that Lynchburg was granted to exceed. The cost 
would then be $2.86/lb instead of $2.58.
The credits selected after Till and Hay/Pasture were point sources. In this region, 
the $20 point source reduction cost is less than the $61.25 to reduce a pound of urban 
nonpoint source runoff. The model could have selected any of eight point sources west of 
Lynchburg and these two were chosen first by alphabet order. In the case of Lynchburg, 
the hypothetical trading example indicated a cost of $4,888,455 — savings of $3,005,485,
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or 38%, from command and control costs.
Proctors Creek
The next trading scenario was Chesterfield/Proctors Creek STP. This plant was 
also exceeding its required reduction in 1996 and would need to reduce 110,445 
pounds/year. Again the model was run with all available upstream nutrients (see Figure 
6). From the objective function, the optimal solution was to purchase the full amount 
from Till farming in h33. Again, this could have been any segment from h33-h39 since all 
were specified in the same manner. The important feature is that the cheapest reduction 
($284,831) was again found in Till, and in the segment just upstream, where the transport 
factor was not increasing cost per unit. The cost saving was approximately $2.07 million, 
or 88% of the command and control cost. This figure is in line with Tietenburg’s estimate 
(1989 quoting 1985) that potential control costs could be reduced by more than ninety 
percent in some cases with marketable pollution permits. Even if Till was required to 
reduce two or three pounds per one pound of point source increase, the savings would still 
be considerable.
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Figure 6. Objective Function for Scenario with Proctors Creek (Chesterfield) Held
to 40% Reduction Level, Point Source and Nonpoint Source Trades, with Transport
Coefficients and Upstream Credit Purchase Only.
= SUM(U optimal h33 : U optimal h39)*(cpur U) + SUM(U optimal h33 : U optimal 
h39)*(cpur U) + SUM(U optimal h33 : U optimal h39)*(cpur U) + 1.35*[SUM(U optimal 
h03 : U optimal h20)*(cpurU) + SUM(HP optimal h03 : HP optimal h20)*(cpur HP) + (T 
optimal h03 : T optimal h20)*(cpurT)] + 1.35*[(optimal BWX)*(cpur BWX) + (optimal 
Lynchburg) *(cpur Lynchburg)] + 1.54*[(U optimal h01)*(cpur U)+ (HP optimal 
h01)*(cpurHP) + (T optimal h01)*(cpurT)] + 1.54*[SUM(U optimal i03 -  U optimal 
i28)*(cpurU) + (SUM(HP optimal i03 -  HP optimal i28)*(cpurHP) + (SUM(T optimal 
i03 -  T optimal i28)*(cpurT)] + 1.54*[(optimal Lees)*(cpurLees) + (optimal 
Lexington) *(cpurLexington) + (optimal BuenaVista)*(cpurBuenaVista) + (optimal 
CliftonForge)*(cpurCliftonForge) + (optimal Covington) *(cpurCovington) + (optimal 
Westvaco)*(cpur Westvaco)]
U = Urban
HP = Hay/Pasture
T = Till
Optimal = quantity (pounds of nitrogen discharge) reduced at optimum/equilibrium 
Model “unknowns” (decision variables) constrained as,
0 <= BWX optimal <= BWX maximum reduction
cpur = cost per unit reduction
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The model becomes more interesting when the restriction to upstream credit 
purchase and transport factors are removed (see Figure 7). Due to estuarine circulation 
and other factors, the transport factor is unitary east of h33. Essentially it could be 
assumed that pollution is as likely to go up as down the estuary at this point, so there is 
less need to account for one-directional flow. However, removing the transport factor 
from consideration in the whole watershed model could yield environmental inadequacies 
unless other measures are implemented. Allowing a wider trading opportunity takes 
advantage of the one point source that has a lower cost per unit reduction than Till 
farming, Richmond STP.9 At $2.16 /pound, this would be the least expensive choice, and 
the total cost would be $238,561. Assume that Proctors Creek would be willing to pay up 
to $5.30 per pound reduced (its cost to do in-house reduction), and possibly more due to 
the all-or-nothing nature of BNR installation. If it were to pay this amount ($585,358 for 
110,445 pounds at $5.30/pound), a significant portion of the $766,813 that Richmond 
would need to reduce its original 244,561 pounds excess would be offset. Plus it could 
reduce the 110,445 from Lynchburg, at its cost of $2.16/pound.
9 It is important to keep in mind that cost per unit reduction is as much a factor of pounds of reduction required 
as low cost of BNR installation. However, the example is good for hypothetical cost variability.
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Figure 7. Objective Function for Scenario with Proctors Creek (Chesterfield) Held 
to 40% Reduction Levels, Point Source and Nonpoint Source Trades, with 
Transport Coefficient, and Removal of “Upstream Credit Purchase Only” 
Restriction.
= SUM(U optimal gl : U optimal gl5)*(cpurU) + (SUM(HP optimal gl : HP optimal 
gl5)*(cpurHP) + (SUM(T optimal gl : T optimal gl5)*(cpurT) + (SUM(U optimal h33 : 
U optimal h39)*(cpurU) + SUM(HP optimal h33 : HP optimal h39)*(cpurHP) + (SUM(T 
optimal h33 : T optimal h39)*(cpurT) + SUM(U optimal h03 : U optimal h20)*(cpurU) + 
SUM(HP optimal h03 : HP optimal h20)*(cpurHP) + SUM(T optimal h03 : T optimal 
h20)*(cpurT) + (U optimal h01)*(cpur U) + (HP optimal h01)*(cpur HP) + (T optimal 
h01)*(cpur hOl) + (U optimal i03 -  U optimal i28)*(cpur U) +(HP optimal i03 : HP 
optimal i28)*(cpur HP) + (T optimal i03 : T optimal i28)*(cpur T) + (optimal 
Allied)*(cpur Allied) + (optimal B&W)*(cpur B&W) + (optimal Dupont)*(cpur Dupont)
+ (optimal FallingCreek)*(cpur FallingCreek) + (optimal FtEustis)*(cpur FtEustis) + 
(optimal Henrico)* (cpur Henrico) + (optimal Hopewell)* (cpur Hopewell) + (optimal 
B oatHarbor) * (cpur BoatHarbor) + (optimal JamesRiverSTP)*(cpur JamesRiverSTP) + 
(optimal Williamsburg)* (cpur Williamburg) + (optimal PhillipMorris)*(cpur PhillipMorris) 
+ (optimal Richmond)* (cpur Richmond) + (optimal Tyson)* (cpur Tyson) + (optimal 
Nansemond)*(cpur Nansemond) + (optimal Army)*(cpur Army) + (optimal VIP)*(cpur 
VIP) + (optimal Hoechst)*(cpur Hoechst) + (optimal Petersburg)* (cpur Petersburg) + 
(optimal Proctors)* (cpur Proctors) + 1.35*(optimal Moores)*(cpur Moores) +
2.27* (optimal Farmville)* (cpur Farmville) + 1.35*(optimal Lynchburg)* (cpur Lynchburg) 
+ 1.35*(optimal BWX)*(cpur BWX) + 1.54*(optimal GP)*(cpur GP) + 1.54*(optimal 
Lees)*(cpur Lees) + 1.54*(optimal Lexington)* (cpur Lexington) + 1.54*(optimal 
CliftonForge)*(cpur CliftonForge) + 1.54*(optimal BuenaVista)*(cpur BuenaVista) + 
1.54*(optimal Covington)* (cpur Covington) + 1.54*(optimal Westvaco)*(cpur 
Westvaco)
U = Urban
HP = Hay/Pasture
T = Till
Optimal = quantity (pounds of nitrogen discharge) reduced at optimum/equilibrium 
Model “unknowns” (decision variables) constrained as,
0 <= BWX optimal <= BWX maximum reduction
cpur = cost per unit reduction
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Repetition of this model would indicate the same essential results -  purchase of the 
cheapest per-unit pounds, and then movement to the next cheapest until the credit is 
fulfilled. Additionally, most model runs would indicate significant cost savings over 
equivalent in-house reductions. In this case, low cost reducers have a financial incentive 
to further reduce their effluent, loads are redistibuted until roughly equivalent, and ideally, 
minimum marginal cost is realized.
Multilateral Trades
Finally, the trading arena model was opened up not only to bilateral trades but also 
to multilateral trades. Atkinson and Tietenburg (1991) find that “[w]hereas simultaneous, 
multilateral trades can instantaneously capitalize on all offsetting increases and decreases 
among surrounding sources subject to the ambient standards, bilateral sequential trades 
cannot.” This set of model runs begins with the 5,065,784 pounds of point source 
nitrogen that must be removed from the system (from 1996 loadings) in order to have all 
point sources in compliance with the 40% reduction. This figure is the total of the 
“reduction needs” column which had been figured as 1996 loads minus .60*(1985 loads). 
One anomaly in this situation was Henrico STP which did not have an NPDES permit in 
1985. Although loadings at this plant are quite high, the plant was considered only a
i
potential seller and not factored into the reduction needs.
Under a purely command and control system, the total cost of reaching 40% 
reduction in point source loadings would be $70,911,551.03, calculated as “reductions
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needed” (in pounds) multiplied by the corresponding cost per pound at each of the 
treatment sites. If a trading system were implemented and only point sources only were 
able to sell credits, the optimal solution to the objective function in Figure 8 would be 
$17,402,990 and the permit sellers would be Richmond and Hopewell sewage treatment 
plants (see Appendix VI).10 Since Richmond was the lowest cost, and point source 
pollution is considered 100% controllable, Richmond would cease operations (or 
completely eliminate nitrogen discharge) at the market equilibrium while Hopewell would 
eliminate about 86% of its 1996 loads. This ideal model assumes that excesses from the 
reduction mandate, (1996 loads - 0.6*(1985 load)), have been eliminated prior to the 
trade. However, if the cost of the prerequisite reduction were to be added to the total 
cost, then total cost would rise by about $2.5 million ($3.96 * 512,073 for Hopewell plus 
$2.16 * 244,561 for Richmond).
10 The incremental cost (average cost of reducing remaining units) was applied to all units produced at the 
plant, under the assumption that point source loads were 100% controllable. This was because no data was 
available for the increased MC as pounds remaining neared zero. Hence the total cost is probably greater than 
reflected here.
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Figure 8. Objective Function for Scenario with All Point Sources Held to 40%
Reduction Level, Only Point Sources Trades, and with Transport Coefficient.
= (optimal Allied)*(cpur Allied) + (optimal B&W)*(cpur B&W) + (optimal 
Dupont)* (cpur Dupont) + (optimal FallingCreek)*(cpur FallingCreek) + (optimal 
FtEustis)*(cpur FtEustis) + (optimal Henrico)* (cpur Henrico) + (optimal 
Hopewell)* (cpur Hopewell) + (optimal BoatHarbor)*(cpur BoatHarbor) + (optimal 
JamesRiverSTP)*(cpur JamesRiverSTP) + (optimal Williamsburg)* (cpur Williamburg) + 
(optimal PhillipMorris)*(cpur PhillipMorris) + (optimal Richmond)* (cpur Richmond) + 
(optimal Tyson)* (cpur Tyson) + (optimal Nansemond)*(cpur Nansemond) + (optimal 
Army)* (cpur Army) + (optimal VIP)* (cpur VIP) + (optimal Hoechst)*(cpur Hoechst) + 
(optimal Petersburg)* (cpur Petersburg) + (optimal Proctors)* (cpur Proctors) + 
1.35*(optimal Moores)*(cpur Moores) + 2.27*(optimal Farmville)* (cpur Farmville) + 
1.35*(optimal Lynchburg)* (cpur Lynchburg) + 1.35*(optimal BWX)*(cpur BWX) + 
1.54*(optimal GP)*(cpur GP) +1.54* (optimal Lees)*(cpur Lees) + 1.54*(optimal 
Lexington)* (cpur Lexington) + 1.54*(optimal ChftonForge)*(cpur CliftonForge) + 
1.54*(optimal BuenaVista)*(cpur BuenaVista) + 1.54*(optimal Covington)* (cpur 
Covington) + 1.54*(optimal Westvaco)*(cpur Westvaco)
U = Urban
HP = Hay/Pasture
T = Till
Optimal = quantity (pounds of nitrogen discharge) reduced at optimum/equilibrium 
Model “unknowns” (decision variables) constrained as,
0 <= BWX optimal <= BWX maximum reduction
cpur = cost per unit reduction
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When nonpoint sources are permitted to sell credits and the transport factors are 
maintained (as they were in the above example), the total cost is $16,635,277 (see Figure 
9 for equation). Once again, the full amount from Richmond STP would be purchased. 
Next, the Till loadings are purchased from hydrologic units gOl to gl5 and h33 to h39, 
each at $2.58 per pound. The transport factor of 1.35 in hydrologic units h03 to h20 
causes the price per unit credit to rise to $3.48 per pound. The solution indicates that 
these should still be purchased as the next least cost option. However, then the transport 
factor of 1.54 west of hydrologic unit hOl raised the price per pound to $3.97, which is 
one cent more expensive than reductions at Hopewell STP ($3.96/pound). For this 
reason, the final 2,958,024 pounds are purchased from Hopewell instead of from Till 
farming in the mountain region. This option represents a seventy-eight percent (78%) 
savings when compared to the command and control option for the same reduction. The 
data for this run are shown in Appendix VII.
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Figure 9. Objective Function for Scenario with All Point Sources Held to 40%
Reduction Level, Point Source and Nonpoint Source Trades, and with Transport
Coefficient.
= SUM(U optimal gl : U optimal gl5)*(cpurU) + (SUM(HP optimal gl : HP optimal 
gl5)*(cpurHP) + (SUM(T optimal gl : T optimal gl5)*(cpurT) + (SUM(U optimal h33 : 
U optimal h39)*(cpurU) + SUM(HP optimal h33 : HP optimal h39)*(cpurHP) + (SUM(T 
optimal h33 : T optimal h39)*(cpurT) + SUM(U optimal h03 : U optimal h20)*(cpurU) + 
SUM(HP optimal h03 : HP optimal h20)*(cpurHP) + SUM(T optimal h03 : T optimal 
h20)*(cpurT) + (U optimal h01)*(cpur U) + (HP optimal h01)*(cpur HP) + (T optimal 
h01)*(cpur hOl)+ (U optimal i03 : U optimal i28)*(cpur U) +(HP optimal i03 : HP 
optimal i28)*(cpur HP) + (T optimal i03 : T optimal i28)*(cpur T) + (optimal 
Allied)* (cpur Allied) + (optimal B&W)*(cpur B&W) + (optimal Dupont)*(cpur Dupont)
+ (optimal FallingCreek)*(cpur FallingCreek) + (optimal FtEustis)*(cpur FtEustis) + 
(optimal Henrico)* (cpur Henrico) + (optimal Hopewell)* (cpur Hopewell) + (optimal 
BoatHarbor)*(cpur BoatHarbor) + (optimal JamesRiverSTP)*(cpur JamesRiverSTP) + 
(optimal Williamsburg)* (cpur Williamburg) + (optimal PhillipMorris)*(cpur PhillipMorris) 
+ (optimal Richmond)* (cpur Richmond) + (optimal Tyson)* (cpur Tyson) + (optimal 
Nansemond)*(cpur Nansemond) + (optimal Army)* (cpur Army) + (optimal VIP)* (cpur 
VIP) + (optimal Hoechst)*(cpur Hoechst) + (optimal Petersburg)* (cpur Petersburg) + 
(optimal Proctors)* (cpur Proctors) + 1.35*(optimal Moores)*(cpur Moores) + 
2.27*(optimal Farmville)* (cpur Farmville) + 1.35*(optimal Lynchburg)* (cpur Lynchburg) 
+ 1.35*(optimal BWX)*(cpur BWX) + 1.54*(optimal GP)*(cpur GP) + 1.54*(optimal 
Lees)*(cpur Lees) + 1.54*(optimal Lexington)* (cpur Lexington) + 1.54*(optimal 
CliftonForge)*(cpur CliftonForge) + 1.54*(optimal BuenaVista)*(cpur BuenaVista) + 
1.54*(optimal Covington)* (cpur Covington) + 1.54*(optimal Westvaco)*(cpur 
Westvaco)
U = Urban
HP = Hay/Pasture
T = Till
Optimal = quantity (pounds of nitrogen discharge) reduced at optimum/equilibrium 
Model “unknowns” (decision variables) constrained as,
0 <= BWX optimal <= BWX maximum reduction
cpur = cost per unit reduction
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If the transport factor were omitted from this last example (see Figure 10) with all 
else held constant, then trading unrestricted by location would yield an equilibrium cost of 
$16,391,012, and the resulting distribution purchases all available Till and Richmond STP 
units and then a smaller portion of Hopewell STP’s units. However, a one percent 
reduction in cost would have to be compared to the uncertainty of appropriate ratios 
without the transport coefficient.
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Figure 10. Objective Function for Scenario with All Point Sources Held to 40%
Reduction Level, Point Source and Non-Point Source Trades, and No Transport
Coefficient.
= (SUM(U optimal gl5 : U optimal i03)*(cpurU) + (SUM(HP optimal gl5 : HP optimal 
i03)*(cpurHP) + (SUM(T optimal gl5 : T optimal i03)*(cpurT) + (optimal Allied)*(cpur 
Allied) + (optimal B&W)*(cpur B&W) + (optimal Dupont)*(cpur Dupont) + (optimal 
FallingCreek)*(cpur FallingCreek) + (optimal FtEustis)*(cpur FtEustis) + (optimal 
Henrico)* (cpur Henrico) + (optimal Hopewell)* (cpur Hopewell) + (optimal 
BoatHarbor)*(cpur BoatHarbor) + (optimal JamesRiverSTP)*(cpur JamesRiverSTP) + 
(optimal Williamsburg)* (cpur Williamburg) + (optimal PhillipMorris)*(cpur PhillipMorris) 
+ (optimal Richmond)* (cpur Richmond) + (optimal Tyson)*(cpur Tyson) + (optimal 
Nansemond)*(cpur Nansemond) + (optimal Army)* (cpur Army) + (optimal VIP)* (cpur 
VIP) + (optimal Hoechst)*(cpur Hoechst) + (optimal Petersburg)* (cpur Petersburg) + 
(optimal Proctors)* (cpur Proctors) + (optimal Moores)* (cpur Moores) + (optimal 
Farmville)* (cpur Farmville) + (optimal Lynchburg)* (cpur Lynchburg) + (optimal 
BWX)*(cpur BWX) + (optimal GP)*(cpur GP) + (optimal Lees)*(cpur Lees) + (optimal 
Lexington)* (cpur Lexington) + (optimal CliftonForge)*(cpur CliftonForge) + (optimal 
BuenaVista)*(cpur BuenaVista) + (optimal Covington)* (cpur Covington) + (optimal 
Westvaco)*(cpur Westvaco)
U = Urban 
HP = Hay/Pasture 
T = Till
Optimal = quantity (pounds of nitrogen discharge) reduced at optimum/equilibrium 
Model “unknowns” (decision variables) constrained as,
0 <= BWX optimal <= BWX maximum reduction
cpur = cost per unit reduction
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results of this model are useful as an analysis of basic economic principles 
applied to a particular watershed. However, the most interesting facets are perhaps those 
which this model cannot indicate. Several of the assumptions were based on “best 
judgement,” yet the model outcome would be significantly different if some of these were 
changed.
Point Source Constraints
In order to create a linear relationship between point source and nonpoint source 
loads, it was assumed that point sources could eliminate quantities as small as a pound of 
nitrogen. However, in reality, installing BNR is a very large-scale investment. As the 
CH2M Hill study indicates, capital outlays range from $104,000 to $73 million in capital 
costs alone for systems that would reduce nitrogen to sustainable levels. Therefore point 
sources may not actually trade in small units but rather in “chunks” of nitrogen amounts, 
correlated with the expected efficiencies of BNR systems.
This constraint may actually be an incentive to participate in trading. For example, 
if Company A only needs to reduce only 10,000 pounds, but its in-house BNR installation 
would be designed to reduce 20,000 pounds, then it will not see a benefit in paying to 
reduce double the requirement. Hence it would be willing to pay up to half the cost of the 
full BNR installation to purchase nitrogen credits rather than having to invest double that 
amount for in-house reductions.
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Information Asymmetry
A trading model assumes that information regarding costs, loads, and reduction 
measures is exchanged freely and without cost. However, examination of any system in 
operation will indicate that this does not always hold true. Companies guard their cost 
data, and gathering and verifying load data is a costly endeavor. There is no central 
clearinghouse for information, and the permit market may not be as “thick” (“having easily 
arranged transactions at predictable prices”) as the market for labor or raw materials that 
Hahn and Noll (1983) describe. Any analysis of a model must account for the additional 
cost (often publicly borne) of information exchange. In the Tar-Pamlico, this extra cost 
was accounted for in a 10% administration cost to cover the burdens on local agencies and 
monitoring expenses. However, this cost may not be so straightforward or easy to 
estimate, and the actual responsibility may be shared by companies for research, 
government for monitoring, and farm agencies to determine nonpoint source compliance. 
Because overcoming information asymmetry is not calculated into project costs, the cost 
per unit reductions in this project are significantly lower than those in documentation of 
existing programs.
Limitations on Market Interactions
One problem with trading and free market applications is the potential for abuse of 
the system. For example, there could be price collusion by several large corporations to 
lower the cost of a reduction credit below the market equilibrium price. One solution to 
this problem would be to set a minimum price per pound. This could be determined by
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taking an average of costs per unit reduction and adding a safety factor or administrative 
cost. Also, the nonpoint source credit sales could be handled through a single agency at a 
single price. For example, a government-linked farm cooperative could sell credit units 
for the average of nonpoint source reduction costs plus a safety factor.
In addition, some modeled permit markets would allow non-profit organizations or 
other groups to participate in the pollution market as “non-dischargers.” They would buy 
allocations to discharge and then retire them in order to reduce the overall pollution level. 
In the trading market described herein, there is no central clearinghouse for point source 
trades or initial permit auction; non-dischargers would have to buy directly from individual 
point sources. This purchase could happen under the current regulatory system but does 
not, probably due to information asymmetry and lack of interest. However, if an agency 
were created to centralize nonpoint source projects, there may be more non-discharger 
participation. Units would probably be less costly and could be purchased in small 
increments. It does not appear that such an option has been attempted in any existing 
trading programs, but the idea does arise in theoretical literature on the subject.
Economist Ronald Coase asserts that as long as there is a “clear rule of 
entitlement” (like a right to pollute through possession of a permit), the optimal result will 
be reached without regard to the exact initial allocation. The Coase Theorem relies on 
assumptions of equal access to information and absence of transaction costs. A 
hypothetical example of the theorem is a smog-producing factory and a nearby village.
The factory is “permitted” to have a certain level of air emissions. However, if this is 
unacceptable to the village, then citizens will be mobilized to determine a “price” that they
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would pay to decrease air effluents or a price that they would accept to put up with the 
current level of smog (if they threatened to boycott or harm the company in some way).
Economists argue that in this way the socially optimum distribution is achieved 
since externalities of pollution are compensated. They also argue that even if citizens were 
allocated “freedom from pollution” rights, there would be some price that the factory 
could pay to induce sale of rights and achieve the same (optimum) level of pollution as if 
the factory had initial allocation. However, the real-world market is limited by the hurdle 
of mobilizing a large enough group of people to counteract a powerful and organized 
point source discharger (Plater 1992).
Population Growth
Data constraints for this project required the assumption of a steady state 
condition. However, this is not an accurate representation, as the population in Hampton 
Roads, VA, is projected to increase significantly. Tied to this is the assumption that point 
source loads are 100% controllable. While private firms may have the incentive to reduce 
to zero if the compensation is great enough, municipal wastewater treatment plants have a 
mandate to provide sewage treatment to the locality. Current nitrogen reduction 
technology has efficiency limits beyond which it cannot reduce effluent nitrogen loads. In 
reality, wastewater treatment plant point sources have maximum reductions significantly 
less than the assumed 100%. Additionally, sewage treatment procedures are tied to the 
flow (usually measured in million gallons per day (mgd)) of sewage material that enters the 
plant.
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The predicament of wastewater treatment plants becomes clear -  a mandate to 
attain the 40% reduction goal in the face of increasing flow due to population increase. At 
some point the plant will reach its limit of technology and be unable to comply.' At this 
point trading may provide significant benefit.
There is an unusual twist to this population and development model. As 
development increases, hay/pasture and till lands are converted to urban lands11. This 
development trend creates increased air pollution, loss of green space, and loss of habitat. 
However, in the nitrogen loadings realm, urban land loads 8 pounds/acre/year while 
hay/pasture and till load 7 and 19 pounds/acre/year, respectively. At least for till-to-urban 
conversion, the associated nitrogen load would actually decrease by 11 pounds/acre/year. 
Although this decreased load is theoretically beneficial to the system, it would eventually 
limit the options available for point sources wishing to purchase nitrogen credits. An 
example in Appendix X explains this concept.
Assessment of a model scenario 10% increase in urban development with land 
conversion from hay/pasture and till was attempted. However, the solver could not find a 
solution, since total available nonpoint source loads across the watershed was on the order 
of 1 million pounds while a 10% increase in point source discharge (corresponding to 
population increase) was over 7 million pounds. However, if this model had used all of 
the hydrologic units in the watershed rather than just those adjacent to the river, there 
would be more nonpoint source loadings reductions available. Therefore, one suggestion 
for future research would be to determine loading factors which account for distance and
11 Forest land is converted as well. However, since it was omitted from consideration earlier, it is not 
considered here either.
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topography in order to be able to confidently include these parcels.
Trading Ratios
The need for appropriate trading ratios arises from to qualitative differences 
between sources, both with regards to enforcement costs and uncertainty of nonpoint 
source loading levels. Nonpoint discharges are more difficult to measure and are 
stochastic due to weather events such as rainfall. Malik et al (1993) indicate that equating 
marginal cost of abatement with stochastic loadings does not yield optimal results. He 
uses a Just and Zilberman (1988) model to assess the possibility of an appropriate trading 
ratio by deriving a relationship between expected loadings per acre and actual loadings and 
using a certainty equivalent of the farmer’s wealth to estimate reduction cost. The farmer 
can change the ratio of expected to actual loadings by changing the number of acres on 
which new technology is applied. Using this ratio as well as enforcement costs, the model 
provides a benchmark optimum equation to minimize control costs while ensuring 
environmental quality.
Malik et al concluded that the trading ratio (accounting for loadings uncertainties 
and enforcement costs) should equal the relative environmental impacts of those loadings 
from the two sources. The authors find that “uncertainty does not imply a priori that the 
optimal trading ratio is greater than one.” However, several existing programs have 
chosen to forego these intensive calculations in favor of implementation efficiency. The 
Lake Dillon project uses a NPS:PS ratio of 2:1, and the Tar Pamlico charges point sources 
double the cost of one nonpoint source BMP reduction unit (plus administrative costs) per
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pound. Milon (1987) also recommends “ample offset ratios (2:1 or 3:1) which reflect the 
inherent uncertainty in nonpoint controls as compared to point controls” as an alternative 
to expensive reliability requirements.
Banking
The biological process of nitrification is seasonally variable. Full nitrification takes 
place more slowly in winter due to more sluggish reactions at colder temperatures. 
Therefore, some regulations already account for this seasonal trend by limiting average 
annual nitrogen concentrations, assuming that they will be higher in winter and lower in 
summer. This variation can be incorporated into the trading process using the banking 
feature. If permits are traded monthly, credits can be generated in the summer by extra 
reductions and then could be redeemed during the less efficient winter months. This 
trading could be conducted either by a single discharger saving credits for itself or by a 
number of companies in bilateral or multilateral exchanges.
Like the point source arena, nonpoint sources also experience a seasonal 
variability. Agricultural runoff is most significant during the planting and harvesting 
months of April through October. However, urban runoff and animal feedlots are likely to 
have a more constant discharge across the seasonal cycle. In the early part of the planting 
cycle, high river flows are likely to dilute the nutrient enrichment effects. However, 
during the low flow, high input summer months, agricultural sources will contribute 
significant loadings to the waterway. This is a time when the nonpoint source BMP’s will 
act to decrease these loads and ideally even out this peak to be more in line with the year-
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round runoff levels.
Economic Outcome
The introduction to this project described the difference between cost-benefit 
analysis and cost-effectiveness or least cost analysis. The latter was chosen in order to 
compare the costs of several alternatives -  command and control and market-based 
scenarios -  all aimed at reaching the same nitrogen reduction. The water quality benefits 
under each type of reduction were assumed to be equal. However, these benefits were 
never quantified since it was both difficult and costly to evaluate the benefits of improved 
water quality. These may include drinking water purity, recreation, swimming and 
bathing, fish health and abundance, improved stocks of harvestable bivalves, risk 
avoidance, wetlands functions (storm buffering, habitat) and existence value (“just 
knowing” that the water is cleaner).
Additionally the equation used accounts for only the private cost (to the company, 
farmer, or locality) of BMP installation. However, there may also be public costs even 
beyond government-funded administration. These could include higher sewer bills, more 
restrictions on drains, loss of access to streams lined with buffers, or reduced sales of 
fertilizer or heavy equipment. A true cost-benefit analysis would evaluate the net social 
surplus -  the social benefits compared to the social costs under different project scenarios. 
The evaluation of only private cost was chosen because it enables comparison of the same 
component (private cost) of different projects and thereby provides an acceptable relative 
analysis of each. Since data for public costs are difficult to find and often unreliable, a full
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cost-benefit analysis should be reserved for further along in the policy adoption process 
when a region can support a thorough examination of a few options, both in terms of data 
collection and labor needed. The goal at the early stages would be a qualitative 
evaluation of the cost to producer versus the benefits to society and a quantitative analysis 
of costs under different scenarios.
CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this project was to determine the applicability of a trading program to 
the James River watershed. The James was identified as a candidate for such a scheme 
because of a need for nutrient reduction, significant nitrogen loads from both point and 
nonpoint sources, and varying marginal costs of nutrient reduction strategies.
Additionally, the Chesapeake Bay Agreement provided a guide (40% reduction) to what 
might be sustainable loads in the year 2000, even if these were not specified for the James 
or mandated on a uniform reduction basis. Part of the challenge of nutrient regulation is 
addressing agricultural sources without a legislative mandate, but Letson (1992) finds that 
“it is easy to be pessimistic about the prospects for PS/NPS trading. On the other hand, 
no obvious alternative exists for achieving NPS control on a large scale.”
A linear programming model was developed and solved to evaluate potential 
trading opportunities and the outcome that would minimize private cost. The 
shortcomings inherent in the model assumptions were also explained, and it was predicted 
that different assumptions could yield more costly outcomes. While the model indicated
70
cost savings of forty to eighty percent compared to command and control, this may not be 
an instant signal to switch to the alternative system. Individual regulatory agencies must 
also consider regulatory oversight, administrative costs, and information availability. 
Hence, the model results presented herein are not designed to yield a clear determination 
for or against trading in the James. The goal was instead to provide information regarding 
potential application of a market-based solution to nitrogen reduction and then allow 
regulatory agencies to design more specialized evaluation models if the general idea 
indicates promise. Finally, trading may not become a widely used program until there is a 
foreseeable increase in the marginal costs of abatement as environmental statutes are 
tightened. Also, the “demonstration effect” may take hold as localities attempting the new 
program are having success, or at least encouraging results (Tietenburg 1989).
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APPENDICES
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Appendix I. Land Use Data and Nitrogen Loadings by Hydrologic Unit.
Source: Chesapeake Bay Program Office 1989 Land Use GIS Coverage, 
“Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient Reduction Strategy Reevaluation, Report #8” (1993).
Key:
Water ac = 
Urban ac =
HP acres = 
Till acres =
Forest ac =
U/HP/T load
acres of Water land cover calculated from GIS coverage
acres of High Intensity Development + Low Intensity Development 
calculated from GIS coverage
acres of Hay/Pasture land cover calculated from GIS coverage
acres of Row Crop + Probable Row Crop calculated from GIS 
coverage
acres of Coniferous Forest + Mix Forest + Deciduous Forest calculated 
from GIS coverage
; estimated nitrogen loadings by land use in each hydrologic unit, 
above acreage multiplied by corresponding streamside nitrogen loading 
factor
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Appendix II. Nonpoint Source Loading Data.
Source: Chesapeake Bay Program 1989 Land Use GIS Coverage, 
York River Tributary Strategy (1998).
Key:
Load = nitrogen loadings calculated from GIS land use coverage
U/HP/T max = maximum nitrogen reduction possible with given Best Management 
Practices technology, above loadings multiplied by BMP efficiencies
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HU# Uload HP load till load U max HP max T max
goi 312,578 56,238 173,514 103,151 19,683 36,438
g02 25,074 44,837 154,621 8,274 15,693 32,470
g03 34,513 69,992 183,017 11,389 24,497 38,434
g04 2,406 44,277 147,413 794 15,497 30,957
g08 7,449 39,525 96,003 2,458 13,834 20,161
gio 23,921 37,344 189,174 7,894 13,071 39,727
g n 143,437 79,530 433,510 47,334 27,835 91,037
gi3 25,843 30,825 215,471 8,528 10,789 45,249
gi5 338,655 26,707 238,749 111,756 9,347 50,137
h01 2,031 16,667 42,430 670 5,834 8,910
h03 107,792 52,479 129,321 35,571 18,368 27,157
h05 19,343 60,823 151,573 6,383 21,288 31,830
h08 439 13,196 28,728 145 4,619 6,033
h14 470 14,943 38,798 155 5,230 8,148
h17 6,382 72,631 130,892 2,106 25,421 27,487
h20 4,588 31,642 60,019 1,514 11,075 12,604
h33 2,557 68,552 158,185 844 23,993 33,219
h38 5,291 58,182 176,401 1,746 20,364 37,044
h39 173,828 80,620 294,779 57,363 28,217 61,904
i03 34 50 6,830 11 18 1,434
i04 5,904 12,791 73,636 1,948 4,477 15,464
i09 25,054 4,865 33,574 8,268 1,703 7,050
i17 3,033 5,454 22,503 1,001 1,909 4,726
i18 4,080 10,219 86,550 1,347 3,576 18,176
i24 2,729 23,549 109,424 900 8,242 22,979
i27 6,121 17,464 64,022 2,020 6,113 13,445
i28 5,547 18,928 50,861 1,830 6,625 10,681
BMP effic 33% 35% 21%
Appendix III. Point Source Loadings Data.
Source: Chesapeake Bay Program Office (1998), “Chesapeake Bay Program Nutrient 
Reduction Strategy Reevaluation, Report #8” (1993).
Key:
Nquantl996 = 
w/ 40% red =
red needs =
xMax =
cpur =
1996 nitrogen loadings
loadings reflecting attainment of 40% reduction goal,
1985 nitrogen loadings multiplied by 0.60
reduction needed in 1996 to attain 40% reduction goal,
1996 loads with 40% reduction level subtracted
maximum pounds available for sale, either remaining discharges (for 
companies already below 40% goal) or 1996 loads with reduction 
needs subtracted (for companies still having reduction needs)
cost per unit reduction
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Appendix IV. Model Output for Scenario with Lynchburg STP Achieving
40% Reduction Through Trading, Point Source and Nonpoint Source Trades,
Transport Coefficient
Key:
U/HP/T max =
U/HP/T optimal =
xMax = 
cpur = 
optimal =
maximum nitrogen reduction possible with given Best Management 
Practices technology
decision variable outcome, pounds of nitrogen reduced in an 
optimal (model output) scenario
maximum pounds available for sale
cost per unit reduction
decision variable outcome, pounds of nitrogen from a point 
source reduced in an optimal (model output) scenario
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Appendix V. Model Output for Scenario with Proctors Creek (Chesterfield)
STP Achieving 40% Reduction Through Trading, Point Source and Nonpoint
Source Trades, Transport Coefficient
Key:
U/HP/T max =
U/HP/T optimal =
xMax = 
cpur = 
optimal =
maximum nitrogen reduction possible with given Best Management 
Practices technology
decision variable outcome, pounds of nitrogen reduced in an 
optimal (model output) scenario
maximum pounds ayailable for sale
cost per unit reduction
decision variable outcome, pounds of nitrogen from a point 
source reduced in an optimal (model output) scenario
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Appendix VI. All Sources Achieving 40% Reduction Through Trading,
Point Source Trades Only, Transport Coefficients
Key:
N load 1996 = 
w/ 40% red =
red needs =
xMax =
cpur = 
optimal =
1996 nitrogen loadings
loadings reflecting attainment of 40% reduction goal,
1985 nitrogen loadings multiplied by 0.60
reduction needed in 1996 to attain 40% reduction goal,
1996 loads with 40% reduction level subtracted
maximum pounds available for sale, either remaining discharges (for 
companies already below 40% goal) or 1996 loads with reduction 
needs subtracted (for companies still having reduction needs)
cost per unit reduction
decision variable outcome, pounds of nitrogen from a point 
source reduced in an optimal (model output) scenario
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Appendix VII. All Sources Achieving 40% Reduction Through Trading,
Point and Nonpoint Source Trades, Transport Coefficients
Key:
N load 1996 
w/ 40% red =
red needs =
xMax =
cpur = 
optimal =
1996 nitrogen loadings
loadings reflecting attainment of 40% reduction goal,
1985 nitrogen loadings multiplied by 0.60
reduction needed in 1996 to attain 40% reduction goal,
1996 loads with 40% reduction level subtracted
maximum pounds available for sale, either remaining discharges (for 
companies already below 40% goal) or 1996 loads with reduction 
needs subtracted (for companies still having reduction needs)
cost per unit reduction
decision variable outcome, pounds of nitrogen from a point 
source reduced in an optimal (model output) scenario
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Appendix VIII. All Sources Achieving 40% Reduction Through Trading,
Point and Nonpoint Source Trades, No Transport Coefficients
Key:
N load 1996 = 
w/ 40% red =
red needs =
xMax =
cpur = 
optimal =
1996 nitrogen loadings
loadings reflecting attainment of 40% reduction goal,
1985 nitrogen loadings multiplied by 0.60
reduction needed in 1996 to attain 40% reduction goal,
1996 loads with 40% reduction level subtracted
maximum pounds available for sale, either remaining discharges (for 
companies already below 40% goal) or 1996 loads with reduction 
needs subtracted (for companies still having reduction needs)
cost per unit reduction
decision variable outcome, pounds of nitrogen from a point 
source reduced in an optimal (model output) scenario
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Appendix IX. Method for Model Solutions.
Data were input into Microsoft Excel spreadsheets under the following column 
categories: hydrologic unit number, maximum pounds of nitrogen removal available, point 
source facility name, maximum point source nitrogen reduction available, and cost per unit 
reduction. Blank columns wre created for the decision variables and were titled “optimal”. 
The objective function equation was entered into one cell, using Excel references to the 
other cells on the spreadsheet (see equations in text which accompany each model results 
section). The solution in this “objective function” cell would be the total private cost 
under a given scenario.
Once all the data were entered, the Solver function was specified. The “objective 
function” cell into the top cell with directions to minimize that equation by changing the 
cells which contained the corresponding “optimal” decision variables (at that point, blank 
cells). The constraints were that the “sum constraint” cell must equal another cell which 
contained the numerical value of pounds to be reduced in that scenario. “Optimal” cells 
were all constrained to be positive and less than the corresponding maximum reduction 
capacity. “Non-negative” and “assume linear” were selected under the options. The 
model was directed to run for no more than 100 iterations.
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Appendix X. Example of Population Growth Scenario.
Assume that there is a system with only one point source that has fully exploited its 
in-house nutrient reduction capacities. It needs to purchase 250 pounds of nonpoint 
source credits. The surrounding land use is as follows:
Urban Hay/Pasture Till
20 acres 30 acres 50 acres
multiplied by the loading factors
20(8) 30(7) 50(19)
equals pounds of nonpoint source nitrogen
160 lbs 210 lbs 950 lbs =13201bs in
watershed.
Multiplying total pounds by the BMP efficiencies
160(.33) 210(.35) 950(.21)
yields pounds available for trading
52.8 lbs 73.5 lbs 199.5 lbs =325.8 lbs for trading.
The point source would buy the following credits
0 50.5 199.5
at the price of
$61.25/lb $5.43/lb $2.58/lb
for a total cost of
0 $274.22 $514.71 = total cost $788.93.
Now 10 acres are converted from till to urban land for development yielding 
new amounts of each land use
30 acres 30 acres 40 acres
and new nitrogen loading quantities
240 lbs 210 lbs 760 lbs =121 Olbs in watershed
The pounds available for trading after conversion are
82
79.2 lbs 73.5 lbs 159.6 lbs =312.3 lbs for trading.
Under this plan, the point source would buy the following credits,
16.9 73.5 159.6
and the cost per unit reduction would be the same,
$61.25 $5.43 $2.58
for a total cost of
$1035.13 $399.11 $411.77 = total cost $1846.
Under the population and development intensification scenario, with a 10 acre land 
conversion, there would be a decrease of 110 lbs of nitrogen loadings but an increase in 
trading cost of $1058. At some point, given the constraint on nitrogen loads, there will 
come a threshold where conversion of another acre to urban land use, with accompanying 
loading increase to point sources, will be economically infeasible due to lack of offsets.
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